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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will take a comparative look at the two dominant and wide-
ly accepted common law evidentiary standards applied by courts nationwide
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in order to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, specifically, tes-
timony relating to medical causation. This article will analyze how these
different standards are applied in various jurisdictions and will also analyze
Florida's approach, which follows the initial standard which was set forth in
Frye v. United States.' In 2007, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Marsh v.
Valyou,2 explicitly held fast to the adherence and application of the Frye. test
in Florida courts for the admissibility of medical causation expert testimony.3
However, many seem to believe that the substance of its decision seems to
say otherwise.4
In an apparent effort to "to limit the admission of opinion [testimony]
based on so-called 'junk science' or pseudo science,"5 the Supreme Court of
Florida held in Marsh that expert testimony is subject to the stringent stan-
dard that was set forth in Frye, which requires the "general acceptance" in
the relevant scientific community of the theory or methodology upon which
the opinion is based.6 However, the dissent, in its opinion, diverged from the
majority's rationale and pointed out that, although the majority claimed to be
adhering to Frye, the fact that it found the expert evidence as to the medical
cause of the plaintiffs condition, which had not been generally accepted by
the relevant scientific community to be admissible is in complete contradic-
tion with the Frye standard.7
This article will, in general, provide a synopsis of the current approach
as to admissibility under Florida law and also provide insight as to the me-
thods that have been adopted by other jurisdictions. Section 1H of this article
will provide a brief history as to the two different widely accepted common
law standards for the admissibility of expert testimony that have been set out
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Frye, as well as
the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision, decided seventy
years after Frye, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
8
Section III of this article will take an in-depth look at Florida's ap-
proach under the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Marsh. Section IV
of this article will then take a comparative approach, analyzing other juris-
dictions' approaches regarding the application of their adopted standard to
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
3. Id. at 547.
4. See id. at 559-71 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
5. Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
6. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547.
7. Id. at 559-60 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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medical causation testimony, under each of the widely accepted Frye or
Daubert standards. This article will also discuss the federal courts' approach
to expert testimony admissibility. Section V of this article will offer support
as to why the Supreme Court of Florida should either explicitly deny the
Frye standard and adopt a new standard of admissibility or adhere to the
Frye standard by revisiting its reasoning in Marsh in order to clarify Flori-
da's approach as to medical causation testimony.
This article will further explain the critical need for the Supreme Court
of Florida to clarify its decision in Marsh because, as its decision is set forth,
many seem to believe that Florida is currently without a clear common law
standard for admissibility for medical causation expert testimony.9 Current-
ly, more than three years after the court's decision in Marsh, there is still
uncertainty as to the standard that should be applied in Florida.' °
This article will conclude by finding that the Supreme Court of Flori-
da's decision in Marsh has many questioning whether Frye is, in actuality,
the standard that is used in Florida." This article will also point out how
some of the standards for admissibility are used in other jurisdictions and
whether they could provide a clear and logical analysis for the Florida courts
to follow.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMON LAW EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
A. The Dominate Standards
The majority of the states have adopted one of the two most commonly
recognized common law standards "for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence in court."' 2 These standards have enabled the courts to
apply a common law standard in order to determine whether scientific expert
testimony should be admissible in court and ultimately heard by a jury. 3
The theory behind both of the standards is to keep "scientifically unreliable
testimony from reaching the trier of fact,"' 4 but the approach that is utilized
9. See E. Kelly Bittick, Jr., Out of the Frye-ing Pan... ? The Florida Supreme Court
Limits Frye Challenges to Medical Causation Testimony, 27 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 8, 8
(Spring 2008).
10. See Andries, 12 So. 3d at 264-65 (overturning the trial court's decision that the un-
supported evidence is subject to Frye and is inadmissible).
11. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 8.
12. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH 453, 480 (2001).
13. See id. at 479-80.
14. Julia Luyster, Frye and Daubert Challenges: Unreliable Options vs. Unreliable
Science, 26 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 29, 29 (Spring 2007).
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under each different standard in order to satisfy this common purpose is con-
siderably different. 5
I. Frye v. United States: The "General Acceptance" Standard
Frye was the first case to set forth a widely accepted common law stan-
dard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence and was there-
fore adopted by a majority of the states and by the other federal courts. 6 The
issue on appeal in Frye was whether the expert testimony as to the results of
a systolic blood pressure deception test made upon the defendant should be
admissible in a court of law.'7 The court, in a citation-free decision in Frye,
held that in order for an expert to testify as to a scientific principle or discov-
ery it must be well-recognized and must have gained "general acceptance"
within the specific "field in which it belongs."' 18 The court set forth the
"general acceptance" standard as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gener-
al acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
19
Under this standard the trial "judges are to survey relevant scientific li-
terature, not for substantive content, but to determine the level of acceptance
within the scientific community.' 20 "General acceptance is determined by
considering 'the quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence supporting or
opposing a new scientific technique." '' 21 The "general acceptance" test was
adopted and applied by a majority of the states and federal courts and was
the dominant standard for over seventy years; however, after taking into con-
15. Id. Compare Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D. C. Cir. 1923) (requiring
the evidence to be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community), with Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993) (requiring the evidence to be both
reliable and relevant as provided for under the Federal Rules of Evidence).
16. See Lustre, supra note 12, at 453.
17. Frye, 293 F. 1013 at 1013-14.
18. Id. at 1014.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *6 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 1, 1998) (quoting State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1196 (Ariz. 1997)).
21. Id. (quoting Hummert, 933 P.2d at 1196 n.5).
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sideration the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,22 the United States
Supreme Court took a new approach as to the admissibility of expert testi-
mony.23
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: The Gatekeeper
In the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, the Court
ruled that the standard set forth in Frye "was superseded by the [enactment]
of the Federal Rules of Evidence" 24 and in light of such determination, the
Court established a new common law standard to be used in order to deter-
mine whether novel scientific evidence should be admissible. 25 The standard
under Daubert looks at the relevancy and reliability of the evidence that is
proffered instead of its "general acceptance" and is described by the Court as
being a more liberal standard.26 The Court set forth its two prong standard
stating:
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence
does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits
on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the
trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the con-
trary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
[also] reliable.27
Although the Court ruled that the Frye standard was superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, it noted that a common law standard could never-
22. FED. R. EvID. 702 (amended 2000). The current version of Rule 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585, 587 (1993). "[Petitioners]
contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
We agree." Id. at 587; see also Lustre, supra note 12, at 481.
24. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
25. Lustre, supra note 12, at 481.
26. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (defining relevant evidence "as that which has 'any tenden-
cy to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' (quoting FED. R.
EvID. 401) (amended 2000)).
27. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
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theless serve as an aid or give guidance as to the application of the rules.28
The Court pointed out that there is nothing in the text of the relevant Rule of
Evidence that requires "general acceptance" as a factor the court must con-
sider when determining whether the scientific testimony offered by the ex-
pert is admissible in a court of law.2 9 Because the standard under Frye ex-
clusively looked at "general acceptance" in determining the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony, and the Rule of Evidence did not establish a
standard resembling the Frye test, the Court held that Frye should not be
applied in the federal courts.30
The Court further stated that even with the displacement of Frye, there
are still limits on the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, and it is the
job of the trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence [that is] admitted is not only relevant, but [also] reliable."'" This is the
central theory of the standard that is now applied by the federal courts and
any state that has adopted the Daubert standard.32
The Court determined that the Rule of Evidence placed an obligation of
"gatekeeper" upon the trial court judge by interpreting the very text of the
rule which clearly proposes a degree of regulation on all scientific evidence
provided by an expert witness before it can be considered admissible.33 The
Court specifically analyzed the terminology used in the rule in order to make
the determination that: "the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to
'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability," and
the requirement "that the evidence or testimony 'assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue' . . . goes primarily to
[the requirement of] relevance., 34
The Court listed four non-exclusive factors that a trial judge acting as
"gatekeeper" could take into consideration when determining the reliability
of the expert's testimony: "(1) whether the theory or technique can be tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the technique
has a high known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has
28. Id. at 587-88.
29. ld. at 588.
30. Id. at 588-89 ('The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and
their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony."' (citing
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988))).
31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
32. SeeLustre, supranote 12, at 481.
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
34. Id. at 587, 590-91. "[I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." Id. at 590.
[Vol. 34
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attained general acceptance within the scientific community. ' 35 The Court
noted that "general acceptance" is one of the factors that can be considered
by the trial judge when determining the reliability of the evidence proffered,
but it "is not a necessary precondition" as it is under Frye.36 Under this stan-
dard the trial court is viewed as a "gatekeeper," and any and all scientific
evidence must be considered in light of the "relevancy standard" set forth in
Daubert in order to determine its admissibility. 37
1I. FLORIDA'S APPROACH
The Supreme Court of Florida expressly adopted the Frye standard for
the admissibility of scientific testimony in Florida courts38 to be applied
"when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or
novel scientific techniques."39 After the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Daubert, the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed its adherence to the
Frye standard and did not adopt the approach taken by the United States Su-
preme Court in Daubert.4° However, the Supreme Court of Florida held in
its decision, United States Sugar Corp. v. Henson,4 1 that "[b]y definition the
Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that
is based upon new or novel scientific techniques. 42 The court also noted
that the Frye inquiry "must focus only on the general acceptance of the
35. Id. at 593-94; Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999);
see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("[T]he test of reliability is
'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case."); see also Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir.
1999).
36. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 597.
37. See id. at 589, 591.
38. See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 546 (Fla. 2007) (citing Bundy v. State, 471 So.
2d9, 18 (Fla. 1985); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989)).
39. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002).
40. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547 (citing lbar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006)
("Florida courts do not follow Daubert, but instead follow the test set out in Frye."); Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) ("Despite the federal adoption of a more lenient
standard in [Daubert], we have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by
Frye."); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) ("Our specific adoption of that test
after the enactment of the evidence code manifests our intent to use the Frye test as the proper
standard for admitting novel scientific evidence in Florida, even though the Frye test is not set
forth in the evidence code."); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) ("We are
mindful that the United States Supreme Court recently construed Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence as superseding the Frye test. However, Florida continues to adhere to the
Frye test for admissibility of scientific opinions.")).
41. 823 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2002).
42. Id. at 109.
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scientific principles and methodologies upon which an expert relies in ren-
dering his or her opinion" and not on the general acceptance of that expert's
conclusion.43
A. The Admissibility of Medical Causation Expert Testimony
A district split between the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal,
involving the applicability of Frye as to the admissibility of expert medial
causation opinion testimony set the stage for the controversial Supreme
Court of Florida's decision in Marsh." The Second District was the first of
the districts to address this issue in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Johnson.45 In this case, the issue was whether the expert's testimony
stating that trauma, experienced from plaintiffs car accident, caused plain-
tiff's fibromyalgia was admissible under Frye when the scientific community
had not reached a generally accepted understanding of what causes fibro-
myalgia.46 The parties agreed that there is an established association between
trauma and fibromyalgia but that the cause of fibromyalgia is still "unknown
to medical science."' The court found that experts based their opinions
upon their clinical experience, the plaintiff's medical history, and the recog-
nized "association between trauma and the onset of fibromyalgia. ''48 The
court based its ruling of admissibility of the expert's testimony on the ac-
cepted theory of "differential diagnosis", rather than ruling on the lack of
causation evidence between trauma and fibromyalgia.4 9 The Second District
held that because the experts for the plaintiff based their opinions of causa-
tion on the theory of differential diagnosis, which is not a "new or novel
scientific test or procedure," that it was therefore properly admitted.5°
43. Id. at 110; see Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995) ("In utilizing the
Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of
both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle
to the facts of the case at hand." (emphasis added)).
44. See Bittick, supra note 9 at I 1-1 2.
45. 880 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
46. Id. at 722.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 723.
49. See id. (citing U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 787 So. 2d 3, 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2000), affd, 823 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2002)).
Differential diagnosis is the standard scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical
problem by eliminating likely causes until the most probable one is isolated. This technique
has been found to have widespread acceptance in the medical community, to have been sub-
jected to peer review, and to not frequently lead to incorrect results.
Henson, 787 So. 2d at 19.
50. Johnson, 880 So. 2d at 723.
[Vol. 34
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Just over a year after the Second District's decision, the Fifth District
ruled on a very similar issue in Marsh v. Valyou, 5' but did not adhere to the
reasoning of the Second District court and certified a district conflict.52 The
issue in Marsh was very similar to that in Johnson in that it involved the ad-
missibility of expert testimony relating to whether trauma could cause fibro-
myalgia. 3 The court noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has distin-
guished between medical causation testimony that is derived from "studies
and tests," which is subject to Frye, from that of "pure opinion testimony,"
which is based upon the "expert's personal experience and training," which
is not subject to Frye.54
The court explained that the overwhelming majority of the courts that
have considered this issue under Frye or Daubert have held that the "causa-
tive evidence linking trauma to fibromyalgia is inadmissible because of the
plaintiffs inability to demonstrate a general acceptance in the relevant scien-
tific community of a causative link between the two. '55 The expert, in the
court's opinion, did not show sufficient evidence that medical science has
accepted the proposition that trauma causes fibromyalgia.56 Without this
showing, the expert's testimony cannot be admissible as "pure opinion" and
is inapplicable under Frye because in order for the expert to come to a con-
clusion it requires the reliance on an underlying assumption, "that trauma
can cause fibromyalgia," which has yet to be generally accepted in the scien-
tific community.
57
1. The Supreme Court Settles the District Split
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review of the Fifth District's
decision in Marsh which certified conflict with the Second District.5 8 The
court, in a split decision, approved the Second District's decision in Johnson,
and quashed the Fifth District's decision in Marsh.59
The court found that the causation testimony as to the trauma and fi-
bromyalgia was not new or novel because the testimony and opinions prof-
fered were based on the expert's diagnosis, reviewing the patient's medical
history, physical examinations, the expert's personal experience and pub-
51. 917 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
52. See id. at 323, 329.
53. See id. at 314.
54. Id. at 320.
55. Id. at 323.
56. Marsh, 917 So. 2d at 325-26.
57. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
58. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2007).
59. Id. at 545.
9
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lished findings, as well as, engaging in a differential diagnosis evaluation. 60
The court relied on numerous cases that stand for the position that medical
causation testimony is not subject to Frye "'when it is based solely on the
expert's training and experience.-' 6' The court further analyzed that the un-
derlying methodology for the expert's opinion testimony was based on diffe-
rential diagnosis, which has been repeatedly held to be a "generally accepted
method for determining specific causation. '62 Because differential diagnosis
is not a "new or novel" method, the opinion that is reached by the expert
based upon this methodology was found not to be subject to Frye.63
a. Did the Majority Get It Right for the Wrong Reasons?
Justice Anstead concurred specially agreeing that the expert testimony
at issue is admissible; however, he did not join the majority opinion because
of his belief that the adoption of Florida's Evidence Code, similar to the Fed-
eral Evidence Code, supersedes the Frye standard. 64 Justice Anstead, relying
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert and previous Flor-
ida case law,65 expressed issue with the majority's adherence to Frye when
the court has failed to explain "how Frye has survived the adoption of the"
Florida Evidence Code, which similar to the federal rule, does not mention
Frye or the "general acceptance" standard. 66 He further reasoned that the
legislative intent for adopting such a rule of evidence was to have courts
"apply a straightforward relevancy test to expert evidence" and the Frye
standard does not comply with such intention of the rule.67 Some of the low-
er courts in Florida have confronted the issue that they believe exists with
Florida's continued adherence to the Frye standard and have reached the
same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court in Daubert because the
60. Id. at 548.
61. Id. (quoting Cordoba v. Rodriguez, 939 So. 2d 319, 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006); citing Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Fla.
Power & Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
62. Id. at 549.
63. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548-49.
64. Id. at 551 (Anstead, J., concurring); FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2009).
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understand-
ing the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by know-
ledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion;
however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
FLA. STAT. § 90.702.
65. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 12.
66. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 551 (Anstead, J., concurring).
67. id.
[Vol. 34
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Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate a general acceptance require-
ment.
68
Justice Anstead pointed out that the identical medical causation issue
that was presented in Marsh has been resolved in other jurisdictions follow-
ing Daubert, and such courts have found that, although the causative medical
evidence may not be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community,
such testimony meets the more liberal standard and is found to be reliable
and relevant, therefore, making such testimony admissible in a court of law
under that standard. 69 The concurrence suggests that perhaps the Supreme
Court of Florida should find that the Florida Evidence Code has superseded
Frye and adopt the Daubert standard, which will enable the trial judge to act
as "gatekeeper" and analyze both the reliability and the relevance of the ex-
pert testimony proffered.7" Such an approach would be in line with the ac-
cepted approach of the federal courts and many other jurisdictions, as well as
adhere to the intent of the Florida Legislature.7'
Justice Anstead concludes by stating that he would have held that Frye
was superseded by the Florida Rules of Evidence and that the expert testi-
mony on medical causation would be found to be admissible after determin-
ing its relevance and reliability as required under the Code.72
b. Does the Dissent Have It Right?
Justice Cantero, in his dissenting opinion, did not agree with the majori-
ty's finding that the Frye standard would not apply to the medical causation
testimony, and as such, he approved of the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
reasoning in Marsh.73 The Frye standard requires that the "basic underlying
principles of scientific evidence have been sufficiently tested and accepted
by the relevant scientific community. 74 If there is not a requirement that the
underlying basis for the expert's opinion be generally accepted, then any
evidence offered would be admissible simply by stating that it is the "pure
opinion" of the expert, rendering Frye essentially useless.75
"Pure opinion" testimony is only that which is "based solely on [the ex-
pert's] experience and training" and it does not require reliance on some new
68. Id. at 554 (citing Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 86-88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
69. Id. at 558 (citing Reichert v. Phipps, 84 P.3d 353, 364 (Wyo. 2004)).
70. See id. at 559 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
71. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 546.
72. Id. at 559 (Anstead, J., concurring).
73. Id. (Cantero, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 560 (quoting Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1997)).
75. See id.
11
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or novel "principle, test, or methodology."76 If the deduction upon which the
expert's opinion is based requires reliance on anything but his own personal
experience, observations, or research, then his opinion is not "pure testimo-
ny" and the methodology upon which the opinion is formed is subject to
Frye.77
The expert opinion offered in Marsh is said by the plaintiff to be based
upon the expert's own experience and training, however, Justice Cantero
points out that the expert must have some basis for forming the opinion that
trauma is a plausible cause of fibromyalgia, and it is this scientific principle
of causation that must be subject to the general acceptance standard.78 Jus-
tice Cantero cites the reasoning of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in order
to further articulate his position regarding the requirements of "pure opinion"
by stating that:
[I]t is counterintuitive to permit an expert to ignore scientific lite-
rature accepted by the general scientific community in favor of the
expert's personal experience to reach a conclusion not generally
recognized in the scientific community and then allow testimony
about that conclusion on the basis that it is 'pure opinion.'
79
To permit such evidence into a court of law would allow an expert to testify
as to the specific causation of the plaintiffs injury without ever requiring
that opinion to be based upon the scientific community's general acceptance
of general causation, simply by saying that it is the expert's "pure opi-
nion."8° It would be impermissible to allow the expert to give his opinion
that trauma caused Marsh's fibromyalgia in this instance without first de-
monstrating that trauma can cause fibromyalgia by showing general accep-
tance of causation within the relevant scientific community.
8
'
The majority opinion found that the expert's testimony was also admiss-
ible because it was based upon "differential diagnosis," which is a "generally
accepted methodology for determining specific causation. 82 However, the
76. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 560 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
77. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 13.
78. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 561 (Cantero, J., dissenting). "This theory of general causation
does not become admissible simply because it is the opinion of some experts that trauma
caused Marsh's fibromyalgia." Id. at 562.
79. Id. at 562 (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh v. Valyou, 917 So. 2d 313, 327 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007)).
80. Id. at 563 ("Permitting an expert to testify that X caused Y in a specific case without
requiring the general acceptance of the theory that X can ever cause Y expands the 'pure
opinion' exception to the point where it swallows the rule.").
81. See id. at 562-63.
82. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 564 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
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dissent takes issue with this line of reasoning finding that the use of differen-
tial diagnosis alone is not sufficient to get around the Frye standard for ad-
missibility because "[d]ifferential diagnosis is not a wild card that can be
used to introduce novel scientific theories into the courtroom.
83
Before an expert can begin a differential diagnosis determination, which
is essentially the process of elimination, the expert must first determine what
the scientific general causes of the plaintiff's condition are before they can
be scientifically included or excluded as the specific cause of a certain condi-
tion.84 This means that an expert cannot find that something was the cause of
the plaintiff's condition in a particular instance without first demonstrating
that it could be the cause of that condition.85
The majority "obscures the fact that differential diagnosis assumes gen-
eral causation ... [and] give[s] the impression.., that any differential diag-
nosis will always be admissible as 'pure opinion' that is not subject to
Frye.86 If this were the case, there would be no end as to what an expert
could claim has been established though differential diagnosis if courts per-
mit testimony on the specific cause of a condition without first demonstrating
that the general causation of such condition is generally accepted by the rele-
vant scientific community.87
Since the expert witness in Marsh was unable to show general accep-
tance in the scientific community that trauma can be a cause of fibromyalgia,
Justice Cantero believes that the expert opinion testimony that trauma is the
83. Id. at 564-65.
84. See id.; Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
[D]ifferential diagnosis methodology assumes the answer to that general causation question,
and proceeds to deduce from that underlying assumption-together with other evidence
gleaned from a clinical examination, the patient's medical history, and any relevant tests-a
conclusion regarding whether the exposure or event in fact caused the illness in a particular
case. From this viewpoint, the general causation principle is the "thing from which the deduc-
tion is made," and therefore, in the words of Frye, it "must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
85. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 565 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
86. Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
87. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 565 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
To illustrate [the absurd results that could result] with an extreme example: a patient suffering
from depression sees a doctor because her arm hurts. She does not know why her arm hurts.
The doctor diagnoses a broken arm. The patient cannot tell the doctor how she broke her arm.
The doctor may, through performing tests and interviewing the patient, conclude that it could
not have been a car accident (the patient was not involved in a car accident) and it could not
have been playing sports (the patient does not play sports), but the doctor cannot then conclude
that it must have been depression that caused the broken arm-unless, of course, the doctor
can show that the theory that depression can cause a broken arm is generally accepted in the
scientific community.
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specific cause of fibromyalgia in this case is not admissible under the stan-
dard set forth under Frye.
88
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: IS FLORIDA'S APPROACH "GENERALLY
ACCEPTED?"
In light of the strong split of opinion as to the admissibility of medical
causation testimony in the Florida courts,89 it is imperative to examine the
views and methods that have been applied in other jurisdictions that have
adopted one of the predominate common law tests, either Frye or Daubert, in
order to provide guidance as to what has become "generally accepted" in
relation to the admissibility of medical causation testimony.
A. The Approach of the "Frye" Followers
Many other jurisdictions have considered the issue as to the admissibili-
ty of medical causation testimony under Frye and have found that, unless the
underlying basis for the opinion was generally accepted, such testimony
would not be admissible. 90 The standard set forth in Frye explicitly states
that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."9' As Frye is commonly applied by courts, if the "thing from which
the [expert's] deduction is made" is based solely upon the expert's training
and experience, and only requires inductive reasoning to form the opinion,
then the testimony is considered "pure opinion" and is not subject to Frye.92
However, if the expert is relying on deductive reasoning to form his conclu-
sion, and it is based upon new or novel methods or theories, then the expert's
opinion is subject to Frye and is only admissible if the methods or theories
are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.93
If the theory or method upon which the expert is basing his or her opi-
nion is in controversy or dispute within the scientific community, it shows
88. See id. at 565-66.
89. See id. at 568; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 880 So. 2d 721, 723 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
90. See, e.g., Grant v. Boccia, 137 P.3d 20,24 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
91. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
92. Id.; see Luyster, supra note 14, at 29-30.
93. Luyster, supra note 14, at 29-30; see also Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d
1170, 1178 (Kan. 2000) ("If a new scientific technique's validity has not been generally ac-
cepted or is only regarded as an experimental technique, then expert testimony based upon the
technique should not be admitted." (citing State v. Canaan, 964 P.2d 681, 691-92 (Kan.
1998))).
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that there is a lack of conformity among experts in the field and throws into
question the validity of the opinion given by the expert being paid to give his
opinion in court.94 If the focus of the dispute in the community is over the
underlying principles upon which the opinion is based, the testimony would
not be admissible under Frye; however, if there was only dispute as to the
conclusion that was drawn from the accepted underlying principles, the tes-
timony would not be subject to Frye.95
In one of the most cited relevant decisions, Grant v. Boccia,96 the court
was faced with the identical issue that the Supreme Court of Florida was
presented with in Marsh, but took a much different approach and came to a
completely opposite conclusion. 97 The decision in Grant, which was relied
on by Justice Cantero in his dissenting opinion in Marsh,98 cited and agreed
with the reasoning of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in Marsh,
and is in full agreement with that court's determination that medical causa-
tion testimony, which is not supported by general approval of the scientific
community, is subject to Frye and is not admissible. 99
In Grant, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's finding that the testimo-
ny of the plaintiff's expert witness-that trauma experienced as the result of
a car accident caused the plaintiff's fibromyalgia-was inadmissible because
the expert was unable to demonstrate that the theory that trauma causes fi-
bromyalgia is generally accepted.'0° The appellate court found that there was
not an abuse of discretion by the trial court because the evidence which was
proffered was not supported by the general community, and it is the type of
evidence which requires the expert to testify as to something that is not based
94. See Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *5, *7 (Ariz. Su-
per. Ct. June 1, 1998).
95. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Kuhn, 14 P.3d at 1183
("[M]edical expert opinion testimony that is controversial in its conclusions can support a jury
finding of causation as long as the doctor's conclusory opinion is based upon well-founded
methodologies." (alteration in original) (quoting Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908,
915 (5th Cir. 1987))).
96. 137 P.3d 20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
97. See id.
98. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
99. Grant, 137 P.3d at 24-25.
100. Id. at21.
[G]iven the clear disagreement in the relevant scientific community as to the cause of fibro-
myalgia, which conflict has also been recognized in other jurisdictions across the country, the
trial court properly concluded [that] the [plaintiff's] proffered expert testimony was subject to
the Frye test and was inadmissible. Until medical science determines with sufficient reliability
and acceptance that a causal relationship exists ... such evidence is inadmissible under the
Frye test ....
Id. at 25.
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solely upon his experience or training and is clearly at odds with the standard
under Frye.'
Courts that continue to adhere to Frye and have not adopted Daubert,
impose a heavy burden on the party attempting to admit the expert testimony
into evidence and require the evidence to be more than reliable because un-
der this standard "it is not enough that a qualified expert, or even several
experts, testify that a particular scientific technique is valid;" instead the par-
ty must prove that the technique is "generally accepted by the relevant scien-
tific community."
102
Because Frye is considered the more stringent test, and less liberal than
Daubert, courts that adhere to Frye do not find testimony which does not
strictly adhere to the "general acceptance" standard to be admissible in a
court of law. 10 3 To give such deference to the expert witness would defeat
the very purpose of Frye by allowing unverified and unreliable evidence into
the courtroom and would essentially turn the courtroom into a laboratory in
which "junk" or "pseudo" science would be admissible.'0" Because science
and evidence as to scientific tests or methods tend to be viewed by society-
and potentially jurors-as the truth, or more credible than non-scientific evi-
dence, such evidence could be given undue weight by a jury because of this
preconceived notion regardless of its acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.'05
"Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle
to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientif-
ic principles .... Several reasons founded in logic and common
sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area. Lay jurors
tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when pre-
sented by 'experts' with impressive credentials." 106
101. See id. at24-25.
102. Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *5 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 1, 1998).
103. Grant, 137 P.3d at 24 (Under Frye, the existence of "acceptance in the relevant
community as to the cause of fibromyalgia ... is necessary for admissibility of expert opinion
testimony that trauma following a car accident caused [the plaintiff's] fibromyalgia.").
104. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Grant, 137 P.3d at 22
(reasoning that the "relevant inquiry is the general acceptance by scientists, not by the
courts").
105. See Lofgren, 1998 WL 299925, at *5; Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d
1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that ajury is more likely than a judge to become "awe-
struck by the expert's mystique").
106. Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1178 (Kan. 2000) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting State v. Washington, 622 P.2d 986, 992 (Kan. 1981)).
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The predominate trend in jurisdictions that adhere to Frye-and Daubert
alike-is a refusal to admit into evidence expert testimony in which the un-
derlying basis for the opinion was not accepted and is unsupported by the
relevant scientific community. °7
The Supreme Court of Florida, unlike most other jurisdictions that fol-
low Frye, found that Frye did not apply to such unsupported medical causa-
tion testimony and admitted the expert's testimony into evidence.08 Such
determination appears to be inconsistent with the requirement of general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community, which is explicitly stated as
the requirement by the court in Frye." The very distinction between the
Frye standard and Daubert is that Frye is more stringent and requires general
acceptance of the experts' evidence before it can become admissible in
court." ° Although the majority opinion in Marsh explicitly states their con-
tinued adherence to Frye,"' the substance of its decision, in allowing the
unsupported and unverified expert testimony into court, completely contra-
dicts the very purpose of Frye."2
B. The Approach of the "Daubert" Followers
The majority of jurisdictions, which have considered the issue of the
admissibility of medical causation testimony, have resolved the question
under the Daubert analysis." 3 The predominant amount of the opinions ap-
plying the Daubert standard have found such medical causation testimony,
which is based on a theory that has not yet been generally accepted, to be
inadmissible.' 4 However, there are a few decisions in which the courts
found the testimony to be admissible when applying this more liberal test
and analyzing the reliability and relevancy of such testimony, rather than
analyzing the general acceptance of the experts' evidence."'
Although general acceptance is not a required predicate under the Dau-
bert standard, general acceptance by the relevant scientific community of a
proposition upon which the expert's opinion is based is one factor a court
107. See, e.g., Grant, 137 P.3d at 25.
108. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. 2007).
109. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
110. See id.; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1992).
Ill. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547.
112. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
113. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Vargas v. Lee, 317
F.3d 498, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying Daubert and excluding testimony that a car acci-
dent caused fibromyalgia).
114. See id.
115. Seeid.at571.
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may take into consideration when determining the reliability of such expert
testimony. 16 Most courts, traveling under the Daubert standard, found that
in order for testimony to be considered admissible, the opinion that is drawn
by the expert must be based on a scientific predicate for which there has been
established acceptance for such testimony to be considered reliable." 7  In
other words, there must be scientific support or acceptance in the relevant
community for the opinions proffered by the experts to be considered relia-
ble, and therefore, admissible in a court of law."8
In Black v. Food Lion, 19 one of the most heavily relied upon federal de-
cisions pertaining to the issues of the admissibility of medical causation tes-
timony under Daubert, the court found that unsupported expert testimony is
not reliable, and therefore, not admissible.120 This case involved a slip and
fall inside a Food Lion grocery store, from which that plaintiff claims caused
the onset of her fibromyalgia.12' The expert witness produced by the plaintiff
was also unable to show that the theory that trauma could cause fibromyalgia
had been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. 12 2 The
court further expressed that the expert's opinion that the trauma from plain-
tiff's fall caused the onset of fibromyalgia failed all of the non-exclusive
factors to be considered under Daubert because the theory has not been veri-
fied by testing nor subject to peer review-it had failed to gain general ac-
ceptance within the relevant scientific community, and there was no potential
rate of error from testing. 123 The court reasoned that:
If medical science does not know the cause [of the medical condi-
tion], then [the medical expert's] "theory" of causation, to the ex-
tent it is a theory, is isolated and unsubstantiated. Even [the expert
has] recognized the limits of her opinion .... On its own terms,
[the expert's] opinion includes conjecture, not deduction from
scientifically-validated information. It also follows from the scien-
116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
117. See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999).
118. See id.
119. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
120. Id. at 314; see Marsh v. Valyou, 917 So. 2d 313, 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005),
rev'd, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
121. See Black, 171 F.3d at 309.
122. Id. at312.
123. Id. at 313; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("Many
factors will bear on the [trial judge's] inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive
checklist or test.").
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tific literature that [the expert's] theory has failed to gain accep-
tance within the medical profession.
124
Because the testimony of causation was clearly unsupported by specific me-
thodology and lacked common acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity, the evidence could not be deemed reliable under Daubert, and there-
fore, to find such evidence admissible would be an abuse of the trial court's
discretion. 25 It is important to note that a majority of the courts applying the
Daubert standard have reached a similar conclusion as to inadmissibility,
which is in line with the reasoning of the court in Black.
26
For courts adhering to the Daubert standard, it is important for the trial
judge, acting as "gatekeeper," "to keep unreliable and irrelevant information
from the jury because of its inability to assist in factual determinations, its
potential to create confusion, and its lack of probative value.' ' 127 Even under
the more liberal standard of Daubert, it is still critical for the court to disal-
low unsupported and unverified science in the courtroom.12 1 In order for the
trial court to properly "carry out its 'gatekeeping' responsibility, the court
has discretion both in deciding how to evaluate an expert's reliability and in
determining whether that expert's testimony is reliable."'' 29 However, "[t]he
inquiry is 'a flexible one,' and '[t]he focus ... must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.""' 3  An expert
witness is different from a lay witness in that the expert's knowledge and
opinion "cannot be based [upon a] subjective belief or [an] unsupported
speculation.' ' 3 1 The trial court's "objective is 'to make certain that an ex-
pert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal expe-
rience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that cha-
racterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.""1312
124. Black, 171 F.3d at 313.
125. Id. at 314.
In this case, neither [the medical expert] nor medical science knows the exact process
that results in fibromyalgia or the factors that trigger the process. Absent these critical scientif-
ic predicates, for which there is no proof in the record, no scientifically reliable conclusion on
causation can be drawn. [The medical expert's] use of a general methodology cannot vindicate
a conclusion for which there is no underlying medical support.
Id.
126. See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 571 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., dissenting).
127. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1999).
128. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
129. Maras v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (D. Minn. 2005) (cit-
ing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
130. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
131. Jones v. Conrad, No. CA2000-12-257, 2001 WL 1001083, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
4,2001).
132. Maras, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152).
19
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A few of the courts applying Daubert have taken a different approach
from the majority of like opinions, and have found such unsupported medical
causation testimony to be admissible under the rationale that reliability "goes
to the weight of [the evidence] rather than to its admissibility," which is a
determination for the fact finder not the trial judge.1 33 However, the courts
which do not find such evidence to be reliable hold that the evidence must
meet the "threshold criteria" which is set forth in the Rules of Evidence, and
then "[o]nce that threshold of reliability is met, then any remaining issues of
credibility remain for the trier of fact." 13 4  It is "the judge, not the jury,
[whom] decides preliminary questions of fact under the rules of evidence
.... [W]hen evidence is offered as science or on technical matters, the courts
must assess its 'validity' [first] by referenc[ing] . . . multiple factors, before
any substantive testimony is given."'
135
Courts that travel under the liberal Daubert standard have also held that
an expert cannot rely on the accepted theory of "differential diagnosis" in
order to testify as to the specific cause of plaintiff's medical condition with-
out first demonstrating the acceptance of general causation. 3 6 "In the ab-
sence of such a foundation for a differential diagnosis analysis, differential
diagnosis generally may not serve as a reliable basis for an expert opinion on
causation . . . ."' However, a valid differential diagnosis test only satisfies
the Daubert standard if the expert can show the general causation of the
medical condition by reliable methods. 38 Scientific evidence is only to be
"deemed reliable if the principles and methodology used by an expert are
grounded in the methods of science." '39
133. Jones, 2001 WL 1001083, at *5; see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d
1300, 1311 (1 1th Cir. 1999) ("The gatekeeper role, however, is not intended to supplant the
adversary system or the role of the jury: '[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropri-
ate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."' (alteration in original) (quoting Dau-
bert, 509 U.S. at 596)).
134. Jones, 2001 WL 1001083, at *5.
135. Sandra F. Gavin, No Second Chances: Best Practices for Expert Practice, 38
STETSON L. REV. 41,43-44 (2008).
136. See McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252 (1 th Cir. 2005). "[A]n
expert does not establish the reliability of his techniques or the validity of his conclusions
simply by claiming that he performed a differential diagnosis on a patient." Id. at 1253; see
also Clausen v. MN New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) ("'[1]t is... important
to recognize that a fundamental assumption underlying [differential diagnosis] is that the final,
suspected "cause"... must actually be capable of causing the injury."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996))).
137. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1253.
138. See id.
139. Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1056 (emphasis added) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida in Marsh found that the
medical causation evidence was not based on a new or novel methodology
because the theory of the differential diagnosis is generally accepted in the
scientific community and therefore it was admissible."4 This rationale is
evidently at odds with the approach taken by most courts, even those that are
applying the more liberal and flexible standard under Daubert.1
4
'
V. LOOKING AHEAD
The Supreme Court of Florida was "unable to reach agreement on
whether and how to apply the Frye test," and the majority left many unans-
wered questions in its opinion. 42 These unanswered questions could pose
much confusion for the lower counts in conducting Frye hearings in order to
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. 43 This confusion is evi-
dent in one of the most recent Florida decisions regarding the admissibility
of medical causation testimony, Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,'
in which the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding
that the unsupported evidence was inadmissible because it was based on
novel and investigational methods.145 The appellate court reasoned that:
The fact that experts may disagree about an opinion or medical di-
agnosis does not transform an expert's opinion into a "new or nov-
el principle" in the second category of opinions, nor does that dis-
agreement preclude or limit admissibility. Rather, the resulting
"battle of the experts" creates an issue for resolution by the jury
146
The court found the evidence of causation to be admissible under the ap-
proach set forth under Marsh, because they reasoned that the disagreement as
140. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla. 2007).
141. See id. at 565 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
142. Bittick, supra note 9, at 13.
The approach the Florida Supreme Court took in Marsh ... appears to narrow the reach
of Frye with respect to expert evidence on medical causation, but leaves unanswered a number
of questions about how Frye applies in that context. It is also unclear how the court's ap-
proach squares with prior case law applying Frye, and leaves for further clarification the criti-
cal distinctions between Frye-testable opinion and "pure opinion," and between underlying
principles or methods and ultimate conclusions.
Id. at 14.
143. See id.
144. 12 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
145. Id. at 265.
146. Id. at 261.
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to the underlying basis of the opinion was merely a "duel of competing-and
admissible-pure opinions."'
147
However, an important distinction becomes whether the experts disag-
ree as to a conclusion, which formed from reliance on a generally accepted
principal or methodology, or whether there is a disagreement as to the relia-
bility or acceptance of principal or methodology itself.'48 If there is a disa-
greement in the relevant scientific community as to the reliability or accep-
tance of the principal or the methodology then that method is evidently not
"generally accepted" and therefore cannot be admissible. 49 Alternatively, a
disagreement as to an expert's conclusion which is based upon accepted or
reliable principles or methodologies is simply the expert's opinion and will
be admissible as long as it is based on an accepted or reliable principle or
methodology. 5 ° The "battle of the experts" only creates an issue of fact for
the jury to resolve when the disagreement concerns conclusions that are
reached by different experts who are relying on accepted principles and me-
thodologies.' 5' If there is a "battle of the experts" as to the reliability or the
acceptability of a principle or methodology it is not a question of fact, but
rather a question of admissibility for the judge to resolve. 52
The opinion in Marsh did not explain "where and how to draw the line
between [the] underlying methodology and conclusions in cases involving
issues of both general and specific causation.' 53 Nor did the court clarify
"how the distinction between general causation and specific causation im-
pacted its Frye analysis.' ' 54 Without such clarification, it could lead to much
confusion among the Florida courts.
55
A. Acknowledgement of Florida's Evidence Code
Florida's Evidence Code is essentially identical to, and was based upon,
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 56 However, the Supreme Court of Florida
has yet to address how Frye is still applicable in light of the rules of evi-
147. ld. at 265.
148. See Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1183 (Kan. 2000).
149. See id.
150. Id. ("The logical corollary of the Frye test's focus on the methodology rather than
conclusions is that even unpopular conclusions are admissible so long as they are based upon
generally accepted methodologies.").
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Bittick, supra note 9, at 13-14.
154. Id. at 14.
155. See id.
156. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 554 (Fla. 2007) (Anstead, J., concurring).
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2010] FLORIDA'S APPROACH: IS IT "GENERALLY ACCEPTED"? 537
dence. 157 Many of the Florida district and appellate courts have addressed
the inconsistency in the rational of adhering to Frye since that is not the
standard set forth under the Florida Evidence Code.' 58
Part of Florida's Evidence Code requires that evidence be deemed in-
admissible "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."' 59 The legislature passed such a sta-
tute to ensure that the only evidence that reaches the jury is both relevant and
reliable in order to prevent prejudicing the jury with unverified and unrelia-
ble evidence.1 60  To allow medical causation evidence into the courtroom
without confirming that the underlying basis for the opinion is verifiable, is
in complete contradiction with the intent of the legislature. 6'
Because the Florida Legislature did not include terminology consistent
with the requirements under Frye, such as a "general acceptance" require-
ment, the continued adherence to Frye by the Florida courts is inconsistent
with the intent of the code.162 It has been suggested that the Supreme Court
of Florida should review the Florida Evidence Code and determine whether it
has superseded Frye.163
157. Id.
While [the Supreme Court of Florida] has continued to apply Frye in determining the admissi-
bility of scientific expert opinion testimony after the adoption of the Florida Rules of Evi-
dence, it has done so without confronting the fact that those rules do not mention Frye or the
test set out in Frye. Hence, unlike the United States Supreme Court, [the Supreme Court of
Florida has] never explained how Frye has survived the adoption of the rules of evidence.
Id. at 551.
158. See id. at 554.
159. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2009).
160. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 9.
161. See id. at l5.
162. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 554 (Anstead, J., concurring) ("Frye is not consistent with
Florida's code.").
163. See id. at 551, 554, 556. Justice Anstead certified the following question to be one of
great public importance:
HAS THE FRYE STANDARD OF GENERAL ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE
PARTICULAR SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY, AS A PRECONDITION TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, SURVIVED THE ADOPTION OF
THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE? AND IF IT HAS NOT, DOES IT NEVERTHELESS
REMAIN A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN BALANCING THE PROBATIVE
WORTH OF THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE AGAINST COUNTERVAILING FACTORS,
AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 90.403, FLORIDA STATUTES?
Id. at 556.
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B. Frye or Daubert? That Is the Question
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has explicitly and adamantly
held fast to the Frye standard, the decision in Marsh appeared to take a more
liberal approach and the court did not require strict adherence to the general
acceptance standard as did other courts in jurisdictions that follow Frye.'64 It
is not clear how the court's decision aligns with the prior case law that has
applied the Frye standard nor has the court provided clarification as to the
distinction between pure opinion and opinion which is subject to Frye.165 It
appears as if the Supreme Court of Florida in Marsh really applied the liberal
standard under Daubert, instead of Frye, when they determined that "[a] lack
of studies conclusively demonstrating a causal link between trauma and fi-
bromyalgia.. . calls for further research [and does] not preclude admission
of the testimony."' 166 The court in Marsh continually referred to and relied on
the reliability of the evidence proffered and did not require the general ac-
ceptance of the causation theory in the scientific community, which is more
in line with the reasoning under Daubert.167
The question now becomes: Does Florida, in actuality, adhere to the
Frye standard after the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Marsh?'68
VI. CONCLUSION
The determination of admissibility of expert testimony is a critical issue
for judges and trial lawyers alike; it is also one of much debate and confusion
among the courts. Because of the critical importance and the lack of certain-
ty that surrounds this topic in the Florida courts, it is imperative that the Su-
preme Court of Florida adequately address and clarify the standard for courts
to apply in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Being that the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Marsh is clearly at odds with the
Florida Evidence Code and the majority of other jurisdictions adhering to
both Frye and Daubert,69 a clarification in the current law might mean that
the Court expressly reject Frye and adopt Daubert as the relevant standard in
Florida taking into account the Florida Evidence code, or perhaps re-visit its
reasoning in Marsh as to the application of the general acceptance standard
to medical causation expert testimony in Florida courts.
164. See id. at 564, 565, 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
165. Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
166. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 550.
167. See id.
168. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 8.
169. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
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